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REFRAMING BITCOIN AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
ARVIND SABU* 
This Article argues that, contrary to the common belief that Bitcoin enables 
tax evasion, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) can increasingly police 
transactions in Bitcoin. First, commercial and technical intermediaries have 
emerged as part of Bitcoin’s ecosystem. This diverse set of intermediaries can 
facilitate tax enforcement, as the litigation over the IRS’s summons on 
Coinbase—the largest domestic digital asset exchange—and subsequent IRS 
efforts show. These intermediaries could report transactions to the IRS or even, 
one day, withhold and remit tax payments. Second, the publicly visible, 
trustworthy nature of Bitcoin’s blockchain—its unique role as a shared truth—
allows tax authorities to observe transaction flows. This renders Bitcoin 
unusually regulable for tax purposes, as recent efforts by the IRS to rely on 
Bitcoin’s blockchain to police tax evasion demonstrate. The Article offers a 
proposal by which the IRS might make better use of Bitcoin’s blockchain: the 
IRS can tailor an existing program to reward technically savvy whistleblowers 
who scour Bitcoin’s blockchain and determine identities that correspond to 
public Bitcoin addresses at issue.  
INTRODUCTION 
Cryptocurrency seems to challenge the operation of the tax system.1 At a 
White House Press Briefing on cryptocurrency in July of 2019, Treasury 
Secretary Steven Mnuchin said, “[c]ryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have been 
 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to Lori Andrews, Felice 
Batlan, William Birdthistle, Alex Boni-Saenz, Evelyn Brody, David Cameron, Sungjoon Cho, 
Charlotte Crane, John Kim, Sarah Lawsky, Ed Lee, Nancy Marder, Ajay Mehrotra, Zaineb 
Mohammed, Philip Postlewaite, Greg Reilly, Mark Rosen, and Chris Schmidt for helpful 
conversations, comments, and/or encouragement. All errors are my own. 
 1. See, e.g., Omri Marian, Blockchain Havens and the Need for Their Internationally-
Coordinated Regulation, 20 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 529, 529 (2019); Omri Marian, Are 
Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 38–39 (2013); 
Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 283, 283 
(2018). 
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exploited to support billions of dollars of illicit activity like cybercrime, tax 
evasion, extortion, ransomware, illicit drugs, [and] human trafficking.”2  
Bitcoin, the first and largest cryptocurrency by market capitalization,3 
purports to enable pseudonymous transactions independent of third-party 
intermediaries.4 Normally, third-party intermediaries—such as banks, 
employers, and brokers—play a key role in federal income tax compliance; they 
serve important reporting and, sometimes, withholding functions with respect to 
their distribution of different forms of income to account holders or employees.5 
The ability of Bitcoin to circumvent those intermediaries and its pseudonymity 
thus seem to threaten our system of tax compliance.6  
Does the tax evasion described by Mnuchin signal the beginning of a more 
broad-ranging shift? A co-founder of the Cypherpunks, a group important to the 
development of cryptocurrency,7 wrote the Crypto Anarchist Manifesto in 
1988.8 It reads in part: 
A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto anarchy. 
Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability for individuals and 
groups to communicate and interact with each other in a totally anonymous 
manner. Two persons may exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate 
electronic contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal identity, of 
the other. Interactions over networks will be untraceable, via extensive re-
routing of encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes which implement 
cryptographic protocols with nearly perfect assurance against any 
tampering. . . . These developments will alter completely the nature of 
 
 2. Press Release, White House Press Briefing by Treasury Sec’y Steven Mnuchin on 
Regulatory Issues Associated with Cryptocurrency (July 15, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/ 
news/press-releases/sm731 [https://perma.cc/Q5F9-BC8E]. 
 3. Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ [https://perma. 
cc/6XTK-RKAF] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019). 
 4. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG 1 
(2008), https://Bitcoin.org/Bitcoin.pdf [hereinafter Bitcoin Whitepaper] (“What is needed is an 
electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing 
parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) (“The structural mechanisms the federal income 
tax uses . . . make use of third parties to the taxpayer/government relationship.”). 
 6. Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 326 (“Blockchain technologies have the potential to shift 
transactions away from centralized, established third-party reporters to distributed networks of 
payors, thereby undermining existing information protocols.”). 
 7. ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A 
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION xvi–xvii (2016) (“Cypherpunks was the predecessor to the 
mailing list where Satoshi Nakamoto would later announce Bitcoin to the world, and this is no 
coincidence.”). 
 8. Nathaniel Popper, Timothy C. May, Early Advocate of Internet Privacy, Dies at 66, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/obituaries/timothy-c-may-dead.html 
[https://perma.cc/QU43-5HXV]. 
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government regulation, the ability to tax and control economic interactions, the 
ability to keep information secret, and will even alter the nature of trust and 
reputation.9 
More recently, a scholar of blockchain and professor of business framed tax 
evasion by way of cryptocurrencies as a form of “cryptosecession” from the 
existing system of states premised on territorial jurisdiction.10 
Even if Bitcoin does not lead to a withering away of the state, its amenability 
to tax evasion may challenge political initiatives to remedy inequality.11 
Presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren has proposed a two percent wealth tax 
on households worth more than fifty million dollars, with an additional one 
percent surtax on households worth more than one billion dollars.12 Warren 
proposes to use the tax revenue for a broad range of initiatives; these include the 
cancellation of a large amount of student loan debt, universal child care, and free 
public university.13 Two economists have determined that the wealth tax would 
raise $2.75 trillion, even factoring in some amount of tax evasion.14 They 
assume, however, that no major asset class would be exempt from wealth 
 
 9. Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, ACTIVISIM.NET: CYPHERPUNKS (Nov. 
22, 1992, 12:11 PM), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html [https://perma.cc/ 
J62B-VPEB]. The manifesto goes on to offer more rousing libertarian rhetoric, technical details, 
and predictions, some of which are prescient; it emphasizes, once again, the ability of cryptologic 
technologies to fundamentally alter the nature of government’s “interference” in economic 
transactions. Id. (“Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval 
guilds and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature 
of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions.”). 
 10. Trent MacDonald, Theory of Non-Territorial Internal Exit 1, 8 (Feb. 2015), https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2661226 [https://perma.cc/8GZE-5JV2] (writing that 
“[c]ryptosecession is the process in which citizens secede from an incumbent state and recoalesce 
in new ‘virtual states’ that are akin to non-territorial public good clubs,” and that though “described 
as a form of tax evasion, . . . it is more accurately classified as a process of partial secession and de 
facto jurisdiction formation.”). 
 11. See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE (2002). Taxes can be an important instrument to control inequality in capitalist economies. 
Id. at 3 (“In a capitalist economy, taxes are not just a method of payment for government and public 
services: They are also the most important instrument by which the political system puts into 
practice a conception of economic or distributive justice.”). 
 12. John Cassidy, Why Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax Would Work, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 
31, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-is-an-
old-idea-and-its-time-has-come [https://perma.cc/4H4S-VHD6]. 
 13. Jon Greenberg, Elizabeth Warren: Does her Wealth Tax Pay for her Child Care and 
Higher Education Plans?, POLITIFACT (Apr. 25, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.politifact.com/ 
truth-o-meter/article/2019/apr/25/elizabeth-warren-does-her-wealth-tax-pay-her-child/ [https://per 
ma.cc/ES2C-ZGGN]. 
 14. Letter from Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, Professors of Economics, University of 
California at Berkeley, to Senator Elizabeth Warren (Jan. 18, 2019), https://elizabethwarren.com/ 
wp-content/uploads/2019/01/saez-zucman-wealthtax-warren-v5-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G3B-
N5H9]. 
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taxation.15 The relatively new asset class of cryptocurrency might challenge this 
redistributive vision if it enables a significant amount of wealth to effectively 
defy taxation.  
This Article is the first to argue that, contrary to common wisdom, Bitcoin 
is increasingly regulable16 by tax authorities. Though Bitcoin enables peer-to-
peer transfers that do not rely on third-party intermediaries such as banks,17 
excitement about disintermediation18—the elimination of intermediaries—
should not obscure the emergence of a rich set of commercial and technical 
intermediaries in Bitcoin’s ecosystem. These include online wallets, digital asset 
exchanges, second-layer payment protocols which operate on top of the original 
Bitcoin protocol, and others. The IRS’s use of a distinctive technique for 
gathering tax information from third parties—a John Doe summons—on 
Coinbase, the largest domestic digital asset exchange and an online wallet, 
shows how new intermediaries can facilitate tax enforcement actions. 
Suspicions about the way in which disintermediation and peer-to-peer 
networks might enable cyberanarchy are not entirely new, and the literature 
regarding the regulability of the internet provides a framework for Part II of the 
Article.19 The emergence of important intermediaries in Bitcoin facilitate 
regulability,20 just as they did in the case of the early internet.21 Intermediaries 
are particularly important in tax, considering they are oftentimes the repositories 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Regulability here refers to “the capacity of a government to regulate behavior within its 
proper reach.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 23 (2d ed. 2006). 
 17. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 1. 
 18. See, e.g., DANIEL DRESCHER, BLOCKCHAIN BASICS: A NON-TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 
IN 25 STEPS 24 (2017) (“Purely distributed peer-to-peer systems have a huge commercial potential 
as they can replace centralized systems and change whole industries due to disintermediation.”); 
but see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF 
CODE 8 (2018) (“Blockchains may reduce the need for intermediaries, but they are unlikely to 
eliminate them altogether.”). 
 19. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998); 
JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD (2006); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); LESSIG, supra note 16; DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE 
WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET 4 
(2001) (“Even if they had path-breaking technology, and even if they flourished for some time in a 
period of blissful chaos, many entrepreneurs eventually found themselves caught by a system that 
bit back—by markets that reasserted their old ways or governments that outraced the technological 
frontier and claimed it for themselves.”). 
 20. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 173–79; Andy Yee, Internet Architecture and 
the Layers Principle: A Conceptual Framework for Regulating Bitcoin, 3 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 
1, 5–7 (2014). 
 21. See LESSIG, supra note 16, at 61; GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 19, at 70–71. 
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of relevant transaction information, and can perform withholding and reporting 
functions.22  
Bitcoin differs from the internet in important ways, however, and represents 
a novel architecture of trust;23 the publicly visible, trustworthy nature of 
Bitcoin’s blockchain renders it unusually regulable for tax purposes. The IRS 
can observe transaction flows that occur on Bitcoin’s blockchain. Put 
differently, the IRS can rely upon Bitcoin’s blockchain just as Bitcoin’s users 
do: as a trustworthy transactional ledger that is not susceptible to falsification, 
absent a technical attack that verges on the impossible.24 In this vein, the Article 
points to the IRS’s efforts to use Bitcoin’s blockchain to police tax compliance 
and offers a proposal regarding the way tax authorities might make better use of 
Bitcoin’s blockchain.  
Part I explains the history and operation of Bitcoin and summarizes existing 
tax scholarship on it. That scholarship by and large characterizes Bitcoin as a 
threat to the existing tax system.25 
Part II argues that the emergence of different sorts of intermediaries that 
operate with the Bitcoin network can increasingly facilitate tax compliance. 
Specifically, though Bitcoin is often understood in terms of disintermediation, 
new intermediaries such as digital asset exchanges, online wallets, operators of 
second-layer payment protocols, and other actors who cater to institutions 
interested in Bitcoin have emerged or are emerging. These new commercial and 
technical intermediaries can increasingly facilitate tax enforcement, as the IRS’s 
John Doe summons on Coinbase, the largest domestic digital asset exchange, 
will show. There are indications that these intermediaries may eventually engage 
in more comprehensive information reporting, and they could even, one day, 
withhold and remit tax payments to the IRS.  
Part III contends that the publicly visible, trustworthy nature of Bitcoin’s 
ledger renders it uniquely regulable for tax purposes. That Part outlines the IRS’s 
efforts to use Bitcoin’s blockchain to police tax compliance and offers a proposal 
regarding the ways tax authorities might better take advantage of Bitcoin’s 
blockchain. Specifically, the IRS can gamify its whistleblower program to incent 
 
 22. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 5, at 697. 
 23. KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 17 (2018). 
 24. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 5, 8; NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 48–50. 
 25. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting, 
16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 348 (2016); Marian, Blockchain Haves and the Need for Their 
Internationally Coordinated Regulation, supra note 1, at 532; Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super 
Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 38–39; Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 283; Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, 
Identity and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering 
and Tax Evasion, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 206 (2013); Edgar G. Sanchez, Note, Crypto-
Currencies: The 21st Century’s Money Laundering and Tax Havens, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
167, 168–69 (2017); Thomas Slattery, Note, Taking a Bit Out of Crime: Bitcoin and Cross-Border 
Tax Evasion, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 829, 831 (2014). 
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technically savvy whistleblowers to scour the blockchain and determine 
identities that correspond to public Bitcoin addresses selected by the IRS. 
Techniques of gamification might draw a large, diverse population of potential 
whistleblowers into the effort, and the IRS’s program could signal its 
commitment to improving tax compliance in this area to the public.  
I.  BITCOIN AND THE THREAT OF TAX NONCOMPLIANCE 
A. The Origins and Mechanics of Bitcoin 
In late 2008,26 an individual or group relying on the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto27 proposed a peer-to-peer form of electronic cash known as Bitcoin.28 
Nakamoto’s proposal first circulated in a whitepaper on a cryptography mailing 
list.29 In it, Nakamoto described the use of digital signatures and a peer-to-peer 
network that could contain an immutable public history of transactions, the latter 
of which would solve the double-spending problem that digital forms of money 
often faced before Bitcoin.30 The double-spending problem arises because 
people can copy digital units of cash and spend them more than once absent 
special safeguards.31 
Nakamoto defined an electronic coin in Bitcoin as a “chain of digital 
signatures.”32 The coins are transmitted partly in reliance on a mathematical 
operation known as a hash function. A hash function is an efficiently 
computable, mathematical function which produces an output of a fixed size 
even though the input can be a string of any size.33 A transferor can transmit 
Bitcoin by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public 
 
 26. NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS 
AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 3–4 (2015). 
 27. Id. Though most describe “Satoshi Nakamoto” as a pseudonym, at least one journalist has 
argued that the name of the inventor of Bitcoin really is Satoshi Nakamoto. Leah McGrath 
Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:05 AM), https://www.news 
week.com/2014/03/14/face-behind-Bitcoin-247957.html [https://perma.cc/E3AV-AU7A] (“Far 
from leading to a Tokyo-based whiz kid using the name “Satoshi Nakamoto” as a cipher or 
pseudonym (a story repeated by everyone from Bitcoin’s rabid fans to The New Yorker), the trail 
followed by Newsweek led to a 64-year-old Japanese-American man whose name really is Satoshi 
Nakamoto.”). 
 28. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 8. 
 29. POPPER, supra note 26, at 20. 
 30. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 1. 
 31. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at xiv (“I can [pass around banknotes] electronically 
with digital signatures, but that runs into the annoying ‘double spending’ problem—if you receive 
a piece of data representing a unit of virtual cash, you can make two (or more) copies of it and pass 
it on to different people.”). 
 32. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 2. 
 33. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. Cryptographically secure hash functions possess 
additional characteristics. Id. (noting that for a hash function to be cryptographically secure, it must 
have “three additional properties: (1) collision-resistance, (2) hiding, and (3) puzzle-friendliness”). 
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key—basically, a payment address—of the next owner, which is added to the 
end of “the coin.”34  
At heart, Bitcoin serves as a payment mechanism that is native to the 
Internet.35 It is both a unit of currency and a network,36 and one is inseparable 
from the other. Because Nakamoto designed Bitcoin to be peer-to-peer and 
electronic, Bitcoin does not require parties transacting on the internet to go 
through a financial institution or other centralized intermediary.37 
Perhaps most importantly, Nakamoto proposed a method for a secure, public 
history of transactions.38 This solved the double-spending problem in some 
electronic cash systems whereby a single digital token might be fraudulently 
spent more than once. Specifically, Nakamoto proposed a public ledger that 
would operate across a decentralized system of computers.39 Nakamoto’s 
system incentivizes participating computers or nodes to expend computational 
power to satisfy a so-called proof-of-work and thereby secure the public 
transactional history.40 Nodes that the Bitcoin community terms “miners” 
compete to solve computational problems or puzzles required to publish blocks, 
and then receive Bitcoin if they succeed.41 Because these computational puzzles 
are difficult, a valid block proves or demonstrates that a node has expended 
computational power.42 For that reason, false transactions cannot make it into 
the valid blockchain in the long run provided honest nodes control the majority 
of computational power in the network,43 as I explain further below.  
According to Nakamoto, the system operates based on the following steps.44 
First, new transactions are broadcast to all nodes.45 Second, each node collects 
new transactions into a block.46 Third, each node works on solving a 
computational puzzle to put the transactions in a block in a form that is 
 
 34. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 2. 
 35. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at ix. 
 36. Though by convention Bitcoin with a capital B refers to the network and bitcoin with a 
lowercase b refers to the unit of currency, this Article capitalizes Bitcoin throughout for purposes 
of consistency. 
 37. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 1. 
 38. Id. at 2–4; Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree, 60 COMM. 
OF THE ACM 36, 36 (noting that the ledger, the starting point for understanding Bitcoin, “is a place 
to record all transactions that happen in the system, and it is open to and trusted by all system 
participants.”). 
 39. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 2. 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. Id. at 3. 
 43. Id. (“If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow 
the fastest and outpace any competing chains.”). 
 44. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 3. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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acceptable to all nodes.47 Fourth, the node that first succeeds in solving the 
computational puzzle broadcasts the block to all nodes.48 Fifth, nodes accept the 
block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent.49 Finally, nodes 
express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in 
the chain and use a hash of the accepted block as part of the next block.50 Thus, 





GRAPHIC OF BLOCKCHAIN FROM BITCOIN WHITEPAPER51 
The “nonce” in the diagram above is a term of art from cryptography; for present 
purposes, one might think of it as the answer to the computational puzzle posed 
to the miners.52 
Importantly, nodes consider the longest chain to be the valid one and work 
towards extending it.53 Though a dishonest node or attacker could conceivably 
publish a block that contains a false transaction, the system would eventually 
reject such a block as the majority of computational power is directed towards 
building a chain of blocks which contain all valid transactions and is therefore 
the longest chain that such a system would produce.54 Put simply, Bitcoin 
operates on the idea that the blockchain consisting of the most blocks represents 
the most aggregated computational effort.55 Thus, false transactions cannot 
make it onto the valid blockchain in a permanent way provided honest nodes 
control the majority of computational power in the network; the latter condition 
ensures that the longest blockchain is eventually the one which contains all valid 
transactions. 
Those mining nodes which adequately satisfy the proof-of-work and 
broadcast a block receive Bitcoin, which enter into circulation at a 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7 (“In cryptography, the term nonce is used to 
refer to a value that can only be used once.”). 
 53. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 3 (“Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the 
correct one and will keep working on extending it.”). 
 54. Id. at 3, 6–8. 
 55. See DRESCHER, supra note 18, at 168 (“The longest-chain-criterion is based on the idea 
that the blockchain-data-structure that comprises the most blocks represents the most aggregated 
computational effort.”). 
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predetermined pace.56 After twenty-one million Bitcoin enter into circulation in 
total, Nakamoto proposed that the system operate entirely on transaction fees.57 
Bitcoin has been characterized as a brilliant arrangement of incentives and 
proof-of-work to secure a public ledger and thereby solve the double-spending 
problem.58  
But it, like most cryptocurrencies, faces certain hurdles regarding 
scalability. In particular, the transaction records known as blocks are limited in 
size and frequency by design in Bitcoin, so the network as currently constituted 
faces certain limitations as to the number of transactions per second it can 
process. Specifically, the size of blocks in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte 
per ten minutes, which allows a current maximum of seven transactions per 
second.59 For purposes of comparison, Visa states that its network can handle 
24,000 transactions per second.60 The limitation on transactions per second has 
resulted in delays in processing and confirming Bitcoin transactions, such that 
users pay fees to miners to prioritize confirmation of their transactions.61 
B. Taxability of Bitcoin 
In 2014, the IRS published its position on the basic tax treatment of 
transactions using cryptocurrency.62 In short, general tax principles that apply to 
 
 56. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 4. 
 57. Id.; E-mail from, Satoshi Nakamoto, creator of Bitcoin, to The Cryptography Mailing List 
(Jan. 8, 2009, 14:27 EST) http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2009-January/014 
994.html [https://perma.cc/P2T4-527G]. In the whitepaper, Nakamoto also offered details about 
reclaiming disk space, simplified payment verification, the mechanism for combining and splitting 
value, privacy, and certain calculations to show the practical impossibility that an attacker could 
prevail in creating an alternate chain. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 4–8. 
 58. Narayanan & Clark, supra note 38, at 42 (“Nakamoto’s genius, then, was not any of the 
individual components of bitcoin, but rather the intricate way in which they fit together to breathe 
life into the system.”). 
 59. DAVID GERARD, ATTACK OF THE 50 FOOT BLOCKCHAIN: BITCOIN, BLOCKCHAIN, 
ETHEREUM AND SMART CONTRACTS 69 (2017); see also Kyle Croman et al., On Scaling 
Decentralized Blockchains: A Position Paper, FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SEC. 106, 108 
(2016), https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~prateeks/papers/Bitcoin-scaling.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5X 
Q-TTFH] (“The maximum throughput is the maximum rate at which the blockchain can confirm 
transactions. Today, Bitcoin’s maximum throughput is 3.3–7 transactions/sec. This number is 
constrained by the maximum block size and the inter-block time.”). 
 60. Visa Acceptance for Retailers, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/run-your-business/small-busi 
ness-tools/retail.html [https://perma.cc/Q4YY-4HR9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (“VisaNet . . . is 
capable of handling more than 24,000 transactions per second.”). 
 61. GERARD, supra note 59, at 69. 
 62. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-1 C.B. 938 (Mar. 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-
14-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AZ5-22BM]. Multiple pieces summarize the brief IRS notice. See 
generally Jose Andre Roman, Bitcoin: Assessing the Tax Implications Associated with the IRS’s 
Notice Deeming Virtual Currencies Property, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 451 (2015); Sarah-Jane 
Morin, Tax Aspects of Cryptocurrency, 64 THE PRACTICAL L. 21, 22 (Feb. 2018); Deidre A. Liedel, 
The Taxation of Bitcoin: How the IRS Views Cryptocurrencies, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 107 (2018); 
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property transactions apply to transactions in which cryptocurrency is used.63 
For US federal tax purposes, cryptocurrency cannot generate foreign currency 
gain or loss.64 Thus, unsurprisingly, the gain derived from investing in Bitcoin 
is subject to federal income tax.65 The use of appreciated Bitcoin in transactions 
and proceeds from mining it will also result in taxable gain.66  
The IRS will issue additional guidelines on the taxation of cryptocurrency 
shortly.67 These additional guidelines will likely address the tax treatment of 
cryptocurrency hard forks,68 and acceptable methods for the calculation and 
assignment of cost basis.69 
C. Previous Characterizations of Bitcoin in Tax Scholarship 
In light of the way the Bitcoin network is proposed to function in the Bitcoin 
Whitepaper, it is understandable that tax scholars have characterized Bitcoin as 
a serious threat to the existing tax system. In 2013, Omri Marian suggested 
governments had failed to identify the acuteness of the potential problem that 
cryptocurrencies could replace tax havens as the weapon-of-choice for purposes 
of tax evasion.70 Marian writes, 
Cryptocurrencies possess the traditional characteristics of tax havens: earnings 
are not subject to taxation and taxpayers’ anonymity is maintained. 
Cryptocurrencies, however, also possess one added value: their operation is not 
 
Nika Antonikova, Note, Real Taxes on Virtual Currencies: What Does the I.R.S. Say, 34 VA. TAX 
REV. 433 (2015) (summarizing and also criticizing the Notice). At least two pieces outlined some 
of the relevant considerations regarding the taxation of Bitcoin before the release of Notice 2014-
21. Howard Wiener et al., Chomping at the Bit: U.S. Federal Income Taxation of Bitcoin 
Transactions, 11 J. TAX’N FIN. PRODS. 35, 36–37 (2013); Benjamin W. Akins et al., A Whole New 
World: Income Tax Considerations of the Bitcoin Economy, 12 PITT. TAX REV. 25, 38–39 (2014). 
 63. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 62, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 2–3, 4. 
 67. Letter from Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Department of 
the Treasury, to Tom Emmer, Representative, United States House of Representatives (May 16, 
2019), https://coincenter.org/link/the-irs-has-told-congress-that-it-will-issue-new-cryptocurrency-
tax-guidance-soon [https://perma.cc/E2JB-U6H2]. 
 68. See generally ABA Section of Taxation, Comments on the Tax Treatment of Hard Forks 
(2018), as reprinted in 72 THE TAX LAW. 27–38 (2018). At a high level, a hard fork constitutes a 
change in the rules by which a cryptocurrency operates, but is a change to which only some of the 
network’s nodes subscribe. A hard fork has the potential to divide a cryptocurrency network in such 
a way that those who owned a particular cryptocurrency before the change in protocol are deemed 
to also possess an equivalent amount of an alternative cryptocurrency on a discrete blockchain after 
the fork. Nick Thieme, Bitcoin Has Split Into Two Cryptocurrencies. What, Exactly, Does That 
Mean?, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/08/04/explaining_ 
bitcoin_s_split_into_two_cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/9HNH-SBBP]. 
 69. Letter from Charles P. Rettig, supra note 67. 
 70. Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 38. 
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dependent on the existence of financial institutions. Thus, cryptocurrencies 
could potentially defeat governments’ recent successes in addressing offshore 
tax evasion. To the extent that cryptocurrencies continue to gain momentum, we 
could reasonably expect tax-evaders—who traditionally executed their tax-
evasion techniques through the use of offshore bank accounts in tax-haven 
jurisdictions—to opt out of traditional tax havens in favor of cryptocurrencies.71 
Marian was writing at a time before the IRS had published its official position 
on cryptocurrency.  
In 2014, the IRS released its guidance stating general tax principles that 
apply to property transactions also apply to Bitcoin transactions. Three student 
notes criticize the Notice on the basis that this rule undercuts the transactional 
utility of Bitcoin as a currency.72 
In 2016, in the evocatively titled piece, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? 
Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting, Eric Engle argued that U.S. 
regulators should ban cryptocurrencies because they enable crime, threaten 
national security, and are a scam.73 Tax evasion was one of the crimes; Engle 
relied on Marian’s piece to assert that Bitcoin serves as a tool for tax evasion.74  
In 2018, Manoj Viswanathan described the potential for blockchain 
technology to enable tax evasion.75 Viswanathan outlines the importance of 
information from centralized intermediaries to tax compliance,76 and 
characterizes blockchain as a technology with the potential to eliminate the need 
for centralized intermediaries.77 Thus, he contends that transactions on 
decentralized platforms and movement away from centralized intermediaries 
would result in dramatically reduced tax reporting oversight.78 Viswanathan, 
however, acknowledges that entry and exit points from the blockchain 
infrastructure can be regulated, offering the example of the point at which funds 
are transmitted from a bank.79  
 
 71. Id. at 39. 
 72. Sam Hampton, Note, Undermining Bitcoin, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 331, 331 
(2016); Roland Weekley, Note, The Problematic Tax Treatment of Cryptocurrencies, 17 FLA. ST. 
U. BUS. REV. 109, 110 (2018); Scott A. Wiseman, Note, Property or Currency? The Tax Dilemma 
Behind Bitcoin, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 417, 419 (2016). 
 73. Engle, supra note 25, at 356 (2016) (“This article argues that the U.S. . . . should simply 
seek to ban cryptocurrencies because distributed encrypted currency enables a wide range of grave 
crimes, threatens U.S. national security, and because cryptocurrency is more or less a scam.”). 
 74. Id. at 378–79, 379 n.248. 
 75. Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 325. 
 76. Id. at 332. 
 77. Id. at 320 (“For any network in which participants currently rely on a trusted third party 
(such as a bank) to confirm the legitimacy of transactions, blockchain technology has the potential 
to eliminate the need for the centralized intermediary providing the verification.”). 
 78. Id. at 323. 
 79. Id. at 327–28. 
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Cryptocurrency and the Shifting IRS Enforcement Model, a 2018 piece, 
contains a practitioner’s predictions regarding the IRS’s future approach to 
cryptocurrency tax enforcement.80 Shapiro offers ways that an enforcement 
model, similar to the voluntary disclosure program that the IRS put in place with 
respect to Americans with undeclared Swiss bank accounts, may work in 
important ways with respect to cryptocurrency.81 
In a 2019 article, Marian argues that jurisdictions traditionally considered 
tax havens are becoming hubs for blockchain-based ventures.82 He contends that 
the decentralization and tamper-resistance of blockchain technologies render 
traditional anti-tax haven policies ineffective and calls for coordinated 
international regulation.83  
Three student notes contain the same characterization of Bitcoin as a tool 
for tax evasion and offer preliminary solutions to this problem.84 One student 
piece criticizes Magistrate Judge Corley’s decision to grant the IRS’s petition to 
enforce a so-called John Doe summons on Coinbase, the largest domestic digital 
asset exchange,85 which is a decision that Part II addresses at length.  
II.  HOW BITCOIN’S ECOSYSTEM CAN FACILITATE TAX COMPLIANCE 
This Part argues that Bitcoin is increasingly regulable for tax purposes due 
to its emerging ecosystem. Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer, decentralized, pseudonymous 
design, as outlined in the Whitepaper, might suggest it is a Wild West when it 
comes to tax compliance, considering compliance relies on a robust structure of 
information reporting and withholding by intermediaries.86 Bitcoin, however, 
does not operate in a vacuum. This Part outlines the emergence and growth of a 
rich commercial and technical ecosystem that operates with Bitcoin. The case 
involving the IRS’s John Doe summons on Coinbase shows how this ecosystem 
can facilitate tax compliance. Theory about the regulation of the internet helps 
structure this argument. 
 
 80. Dashiell C. Shapiro, Cryptocurrency and the Shifting IRS Enforcement Model, 1 STAN. J. 
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2018), https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/crypto-irs-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/BXF3-HC7R]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Marian, Blockchain Haves and the Need for Their Internationally Coordinated 
Regulation, supra note 1, at 529. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Gruber, supra note 25, at 169 (arguing that Bitcoin poses serious questions related to tax 
reporting); Sanchez, supra note 25, at 189 (describing Bitcoin as an anonymous ledger which leaves 
no paper trail by which the IRS Criminal Investigation Unit can investigate individuals committing 
money laundering and tax evasion); Slattery, supra note 25, at 831 (arguing that serious concerns 
about tax evasion with Bitcoin can be addressed by self-reporting requirements and a multilateral 
tax agreement). 
 85. Austin Elliott, Note, Collection of Cryptocurrency Customer-Information: Tax 
Enforcement Mechanism or Invasion of Privacy?, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 1 (2017). 
 86. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 697; Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 333. 
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A. The Regulation of the Internet as Theoretical Background 
Bitcoin invites comparisons to the early internet,87 and legal scholarship on 
the regulability of the internet illuminates how tax authorities can increasingly 
police Bitcoin despite characterizations to the contrary. In 1999, Lawrence 
Lessig argued in the first edition of Code against the then common view that the 
internet was beyond the reach of real-space regulation.88 That view famously 
found a voice in John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of Independence for 
Cyberspace”: 
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come 
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of 
the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather.89 
Legal scholars David Johnson and David Post expressed a related proposition in 
1996: 
The rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries throws 
the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need to become 
the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any 
current territorially based sovereign.90 
Lessig challenged this position with a prescient argument that the internet was 
not only regulable, but uniquely so.91  
Part of Lessig’s argument involved close attention to the way in which 
governmental regulation benefits from commercial efforts on the internet. As 
Lessig described of the internet, users oftentimes cede privacy and autonomy for 
the sake of convenience and utility. He writes, 
Commerce has done its part—for commerce, and indirectly, for governments. 
Technologies that make commerce more efficient are also technologies that 
make regulation simpler. The one supports the other. There are a host of 
technologies now that make it easier to know who someone is on the Net, what 
they’re doing, and where they’re doing it. These technologies were built to make 
 
 87. See, e.g., Jon Russell, Coinbase Plots to Become the New York Stock Exchange of Crypto 
Securities, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 7, 2018, 6:27 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/07/coinbase-
plots-to-become-the-new-york-stock-exchange-of-crypto-securities/ [https://perma.cc/S3BK-8N 
QA] (quoting Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong saying, “Web 1.0 was about publishing information, 
web 2.0 was about interaction and web 3.0 is going to be about value transfer on the internet because 
now the web has this native currency and so applications can be built that instantly tap into this 
global economy on the internet . . . .”). 
 88. LESSIG, supra note 16, at ix. 
 89. Reprinted in id. at 3. 
 90. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996). 
 91. LESSIG, supra note 16, at 23–24. 
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business work better. They make life on the Internet safer. But the by-product 
of these technologies is to make the Net more regulable.92 
Lessig clarified that more regulable does not mean, of course, perfectly 
regulable.93 
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu continued Lessig’s line of argument in Who 
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, in which they 
documented the way in which the internet came to be a technology that 
facilitated the enforcement of laws rather than resisting territorial law.94 The 
internet’s ascendance did not eliminate intermediaries, as some believed it 
would, but just changed who served as intermediaries.95 Wu and Goldsmith 
noted the practical difficulty of eliminating intermediaries altogether.96 
Certain scholars have come to similar insights regarding blockchain. In 
2014, Andy Yee framed the Bitcoin ecosystem in terms of the layered model of 
internet architecture.97 Yee argued that intermediaries in the information layer—
the layer of actors who interface between the technical community and real 
economy—are appropriate targets of state regulation.98 Primavera De Filippi 
and Aaron Wright extensively rely on Lessig in outlining intermediaries that 
may be subject to regulation in the context of blockchain.99 These include new 
businesses and services built on top of blockchain, miners, internet service 
providers, and information intermediaries such as search engines and social 
networks.100 
B. The IRS’s John Doe Summons on Coinbase 
The IRS’s John Doe summons on the largest domestic digital asset 
exchange101 and wallet provides an important illustration of the mechanics of 
how Bitcoin is increasingly regulable for tax purposes. Examples of different 
kinds of emerging commercial and technical intermediaries show how this 
process might unfold. These entities and networks collect customer information 
as a commercial necessity and, in some cases, as a legal requirement; they can 
 
 92. Id. at 61. 
 93. Id. 
 94. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 19, at 10 (“The Yahoo story encapsulates the Internet’s 
transformation from a technology that resists territorial law to one that facilitates its enforcement.”). 
 95. Id. at 70 (“The rise of networking did not eliminate intermediaries, but rather changed who 
they are.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Yee, supra note 20, at 1. 
 98. Id. at 4–5. 
 99. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 173. 
 100. Id. at 177–81. 
 101. Declaration of David Utzke in Support of Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service 
Summons at 5, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. 2017) (Dkt. No. 
1-1) (“Additional research on Coinbase shows that in the 30-day period ending December 14, 2015, 
Coinbase was . . . the largest exchanger in the U.S. of bitcoin into U.S. dollars.”). 
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remit relevant tax information to the authorities. That information includes legal 
identity and transaction details.  
These commercial and technical efforts on the Bitcoin “base layer” make it 
far more usable to consumers and merchants. Many customers and merchants 
relinquish some of the theoretical pseudonymity of operating at the base layer to 
take advantage of these technologies, just as users of the internet might cede 
privacy and autonomy for convenience and utility.  
Coinbase offers a broad set of functions to customers. Coinbase, as of 
December 2015, offered an online wallet102 for Bitcoin storage and transactions, 
an exchange for trading cryptocurrency, an application programming interface 
for developers and merchants to build applications and accept Bitcoin payments, 
and a Visa-branded debit card that enables Coinbase users in the US to spend 
Bitcoin where Visa is accepted.103 Bitcoin exchanges accept deposits in fiat 
currency or Bitcoin, enable users to make or receive Bitcoin payments, and, most 
importantly, allow users to exchange Bitcoin for fiat currency or vice versa.104 
These exchange transactions do not occur on Bitcoin’s blockchain; a user is 
merely matched with someone who is willing to be on “the other side” of the 
transaction.105 The majority of those who buy or trade Bitcoin rely on digital 
asset exchanges and, by and large, cede a significant amount of privacy to do 
so.106  
1. Legal Background 
The IRS has several important tools when it suspects tax evasion by a group. 
To accomplish its mandate to ascertain the correctness of tax returns and to 
determine a taxpayer’s tax liability, the Service has the authority to examine 
relevant records and summon taxpayers or third parties who may have such 
records.107  
 
 102. As stated above, spending Bitcoin requires knowledge of a public key and a private key, 
the latter of which should remain secret. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 76. Key management 
might simply involve storing keys on one’s local device; this would typically involve wallet 
software that keeps track of coins, manages the details of keys, and offers a convenient user 
interface. Id. at 77. An online wallet is similar to a local wallet, but information is stored in the 
cloud; convenience is the advantage of an online wallet as it does not require the installation of any 
special software. Id. at 88 (“A big advantage [of an online wallet] is that it’s convenient.”). 
 103. United States’ Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe 
Summons at 5–6, In re Tax Liabs. Of John Does, No. 3:16-cv-06658-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2016) 
(Dkt. No. 2) (“As of December 2015, Coinbase has four main products: (1) an exchange for trading 
bitcoin and fiat currency . . . ; (2) a wallet for bitcoin storage and transactions; (3) an application 
programming interface (API) for developers and merchants to build applications and accept bitcoin 
payments; and (4) ‘Shift Card,’ the first U.S.-issued bitcoin debit card.”). 
 104. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 88–89. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Part II.C.1 below. 
 107. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (2012). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
196 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:181 
The Service may issue a so-called John Doe summons, which does not 
specifically identify the taxpayer under investigation, provided it meets certain 
requirements.108 Specifically, the Service must establish that: (1) the summons 
relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group of 
people; (2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that the person or group may 
have failed to comply with any provision of the tax law; and (3) the information 
sought is not readily available from other sources.109 Before such a summons 
can be served, it must be approved for service by a district court in an ex parte 
proceeding.110 The IRS famously employed a John Doe summons in 2008 when 
it sought the names of thousands of US taxpayers who held UBS accounts in 
Switzerland and who allegedly failed to meet tax obligations.111 
2. The Government’s Case Against Coinbase 
On November 17, 2016, the Department of Justice petitioned the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California for an order 
authorizing the IRS to serve a John Doe summons on Coinbase for information 
related to users who entered into cryptocurrency transactions in 2013 through 
2015.112 In the memorandum supporting the petition, the government contended 
that the IRS was concerned U.S. taxpayers were underreporting taxable income 
from virtual currency transactions.113 The government pointed to purported 
anonymity and lack of third-party reporting in virtual currency transactions.114  
To further the IRS’s investigation into the identities of U.S. taxpayers who 
had failed to report virtual currency transactions, the government sought 
information regarding U.S. persons who conducted transactions in virtual 
currency between 2013 and 2015.115 The summons requested nine categories of 
documents including complete user profiles, know-your-customer due diligence, 
documents regarding third-party access, transaction logs, records of payments 
processed, correspondence between Coinbase and Coinbase users, account or 
invoice statements, records of payments, and exception records produced by 
Coinbase’s anti-money-laundering system.116 On November 30, 2016, the court 
 
 108. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f) (2012). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(2) (2012). 
 111. Beckett G. Cantley, The UBS Case: The U.S. Attack on Swiss Banking Sovereignty, 7 BYU 
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 1, 18 (2011). 
 112. United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 1–2, In re 
Tax Liabs. Of John Does, No. 3:16-cv-06658-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2016) (Dkt. No. 1). 
 113. United States’ Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe 
Summons, supra note 103, at 2. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 9. 
 116. Id. 
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granted the Government’s petition for leave to serve the John Doe summons on 
Coinbase.117  
In late 2016, Coinbase posted a statement on its blog regarding the summons 
which read, in part: 
Although Coinbase’s general practice is to cooperate with properly targeted law 
enforcement inquiries, we are extremely concerned with the indiscriminate 
breadth of the government’s request. Our customers’ privacy rights are 
important to us and our legal team is in the process of examining the 
government’s petition. In its current form, we will oppose the government’s 
petition in court.118 
Coinbase’s legal counsel made similar comments around the same time.119 
Coinbase refused to comply with the IRS’s summons, and the government 
filed a petition to enforce the summons on March 16, 2017.120 In support of the 
petition to enforce the summons, the government submitted a declaration from 
a senior revenue agent at the IRS who was assigned to virtual currency 
matters.121 He stated that only 800 to 900 persons electronically filed a required 
form regarding dispositions of capital assets with a property description “likely 
related to Bitcoin” in each of the years 2013 through 2015.122 The government 
contended that Coinbase claimed to have had 500,000 users during the summons 
period.123 
After the court heard argument on a motion to quash the summons and a 
motion to intervene, and eight months after the government served the initial 
summons, the Service narrowed its request.124 Specifically, the IRS only sought 
information regarding accounts “with at least the equivalent of $20,000 in any 
 
 117. Order Granting Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 2, In re Tax 
Liabs. Of John Does, No. 3:16-cv-06658-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2016) (Dkt. No. 7). 
 118. Protecting Customer Privacy, THE COINBASE BLOG (Nov. 18, 2016), https://blog.coin 
base.com/protecting-customer-privacy-ec7e0e1c4d53 [https://perma.cc/E4SA-SLWP]. 
 119. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Users Who Evade Taxes Are Sought by the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/business/dealbook/irs-is-seeking-tax-evad 
ers-who-use-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/SG5B-24R5] (“‘We want to work with law 
enforcement—that’s generally our policy,’ the company’s head legal counsel, Juan Suarez, said 
Friday. ‘But we can’t tolerate sweeping fishing expeditions. We are very concerned about the 
financial privacy rights of our customers.’”). 
 120. United States’ Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service Summons at 1–2, United 
States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2017) (Dkt. No. 1). 
 121. Declaration of David Utzke in Support of Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service 
Summons at 2, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) 
(Dkt. No. 3). 
 122. Id. at 4, ¶ 13. 
 123. United States’ Response to Coinbase Inc.’s Opposition to Petition to Enforce Internal 
Revenue Service Summons at 7, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 1, 2017) (Dkt. No. 65). 
 124. United States’ Notice of Narrowed Summons Requests for Enforcement at 2, United States 
v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2017) (Dkt. No. 37). 
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one transaction type (buy, sell, send, or receive) in any one year during the 2013–
15 period.”125 The narrowed summons did not include users who only bought 
and held Bitcoin during the 2013–15 period and those for whom Coinbase had 
filed 1099-Ks—information returns regarding transactions settled through third-
party payment networks which are required to be filed where the total amount 
of the transactions exceeds $20,000 and the total number of transactions exceeds 
200.126 The Service sought account records, records of know-your-customer 
diligence, all records of account activity, correspondence between Coinbase and 
the user, periodic statements of account or invoices, and agreements or 
instructions granting third parties access, control, or transaction approval 
authority.127  
Coinbase refused to comply with the narrowed summons and opposed the 
government’s petition to enforce the John Doe summons.128 In its order on the 
petition to enforce the John Doe summons, the court held that the government 
had met its minimal burden to show that the narrowed summons satisfied a 
legitimate investigative purpose, but reduced the scope of the records covered to 
those which it considered relevant to the threshold question of whether there was 
taxable gain in Bitcoin transactions. Thus, the court granted the petition to 
enforce the summons with respect to limited information regarding the 
taxpayers, records of account activity, and all periodic statements of account. 
Finally, the court concluded that Coinbase had failed to meet their heavy burden 
to show an abuse of process on the Service’s part.129 
The conclusion of the litigation regarding the Service’s John Doe summons 
on Coinbase is not surprising. The IRS demonstrated that relatively few 
taxpayers had properly accounted for Bitcoin transactions in 2013 to 2015, and 
so the IRS used a traditional, court-sanctioned method to gather more 
information regarding noncompliant taxpayers from the largest domestic digital 
currency exchange. Though Coinbase and others argued the summons was 
overbroad, the Service subsequently limited it to cases of material 
 
 125. Id. at 2, ¶ 2. 
 126. 26 U.S.C. § 6050W(e) (2012). 
 127. United States’ Notice of Narrowed Summons Requests for Enforcement, supra note 124, 
at 2. 
 128. Respondent Coinbase, Inc.’s Opposition to Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service 
Summons at 1, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) 
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enforce. Intervenor John Doe 4’s Opposition to Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service 
Summons, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) (Dkt. 
No. 44). Three organizations, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Coin Center, and the Digital 
Currency and Ledger Defense Coalition, filed amici briefs in opposition to the Service’s petition to 
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Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2017) (Dkt. Nos. 50, 52, and 54). 
 129. Order re Petition to Enforce IRS Summons at 13–14, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 
3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (Dkt. No. 78). 
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noncompliance about which it had no information, and the court limited the 
precise records to be delivered based on relevance. In this way, Coinbase did not 
have to divulge information about all or most customers during 2013 to 2015 
and could respectably maintain the position that it sought to ensure client privacy 
and, to a limited extent, succeeded in doing so. In short, the IRS got information 
regarding significant potential tax cheats, and Coinbase saved face, in part, 
regarding privacy; Coinbase was not legally compelled to be transparent to tax 
authorities. 
Now, the IRS is using data from the summons to direct enforcement 
actions.130 The Service has sent letters to taxpayers suspected of not properly 
reporting cryptocurrency transactions.131 The letter informs taxpayers they may 
be subject to civil or criminal enforcement actions if they do not accurately 
report their cryptocurrency transactions.132 
The Coinbase case demonstrates that commercial endeavors have resulted 
in an infrastructure around the Bitcoin network which can facilitate IRS 
enforcement actions. The race, unsuccessful thus far, to create a Bitcoin 
exchange-traded fund offers another view of the way in which commercial 
efforts around the Bitcoin network indirectly facilitate the growing regulability 
of Bitcoin by tax authorities. 
C. Emerging Intermediaries 
1. The Bitcoin Over-the-Counter Market and a Proposed Bitcoin ETF 
The development of a Bitcoin exchange-traded fund (“ETF”) offers another 
example of commercial efforts that might result in a repository of relevant 
transaction information regarding markets in Bitcoin—information upon which 
tax authorities might rely. An ETF allows investors to enter and exit positions 
promptly throughout the trading day and to do so at little cost.133 ETFs offer 
“seemingly endless combinations of asset classes, investment strategies, and 
long, short, and inverse exposures.”134 
 
 130. Allyson Versprille, IRS Targets Crypto Users Who May Have Misreported Transactions, 
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (July 17, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-re 
port/irs-targets-crypto-users-who-may-have-misreported-transactions [https://perma.cc/KQ8N-3J 
BY ] (“IRS officials have recently said they’re using data from the summons to direct the agency’s 
enforcement actions.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Henry T.C. Hu & John D. Morley, A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-Traded Funds, 
91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 851 (2018) (“ETFs allow investors not only to enter and exit positions 
nearly instantaneously throughout the trading day, but, critically, to also do so at little cost—that 
is, at a trading price nearly equal to the NAV of the shares.”). 
 134. Id. 
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Multiple parties seek to deliver the first Bitcoin ETF. In 2016, one US 
equities exchange—the Bats BZX Exchange135—sought to list an exchange-
traded fund consisting of shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust.136 The SEC 
rejected the Bats BZX Exchange’s application to list shares of the Winklevoss 
Bitcoin Trust because of, in short, the alleged potential for fraud and 
manipulation in Bitcoin markets on digital asset exchanges.137 More precisely, 
the SEC determined that the exchange had not met its burden to show the 
proposal was consistent with the requirement under Exchange Act Section 
6(b)(5) that the rules of a national securities exchange be designed “to prevent 
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” and “to protect investors and the 
public interest.”138 
Multiple exchanges have sought to list Bitcoin ETFs, including ones which 
short Bitcoin, but as of this writing, no exchange has yet secured the SEC’s 
approval. For example, in August of 2018, the SEC rejected proposals from 
NYSE Arca and Cboe to list Bitcoin exchange-traded funds proposed by 
ProShares,139 Direxion,140 and Granite Shares141 in a staff decision; two days 
later, the SEC stayed those rejections pending a review by the full 
commission.142  
A recent proposal for a Bitcoin ETF, however, offers a view of how 
commercial efforts might increasingly expose Bitcoin markets to regulatory 
oversight. One exchange—Cboe—has proposed to list SolidX Bitcoin Shares 
issued by the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust. Though Cboe’s joint proposal with 
VanEck and SolidX was withdrawn from consideration in January of 2019 due 
to the government shutdown, the parties then resubmitted their joint proposal in 
 
 135. CBOE acquired Bats Global Markets in 2017. Robert Reed, CBOE Reaches for New 
Heights with $3.4 Billion Deal for Bats Global Markets, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017, 2:56 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-cboe-bats-merger-robert-reed-0302-biz-20170301-
column.html [https://perma.cc/8CBB-W5EY]. 
 136. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-
83723 at 1 (July 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/34-83723.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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 137. Id. at 11–12. 
 138. Id. at 1–6. 
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83912 at 1, 24 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2018/34-83912.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UN3S-WVQ3]. 
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83913 at 1, 33 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/cboebzx/2018/34-83913.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ELV4-5BX9]. 
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substantially similar form.143 Cboe again withdrew its proposal in September of 
2019, but continues to work with regulators and market participants to progress 
towards a Bitcoin ETF.144  
Cboe’s joint proposal reflected, understandably, a Bitcoin ETF design 
responsive to the SEC’s concerns set forth in the Winklevoss ETF Rejection.145 
Cboe’s proposal eschewed, to the extent possible, reliance on digital asset 
exchanges, about whose manipulation the SEC was concerned.146 Instead, the 
ETF would have principally relied on the over-the-counter market for Bitcoin.  
The large over-the-counter market in Bitcoin represents twenty-five to fifty 
percent of the volume of Bitcoin traded in USD on USD-denominated Bitcoin 
exchanges.147 The application for the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF describes the 
over-the-counter market in Bitcoin as one conducted on a principal-to-principal 
basis without a formal structure or open-outcry meeting place.148 Parties who 
engage in over-the-counter transactions will agree upon a price, often via phone 
or email, and then enter into transactions.149 The trust that would purchase 
Bitcoin on behalf of the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF intended to effect over-
the-counter Bitcoin transactions with well-established institutions, who would 
be subject to the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust’s anti-money laundering and 
know-your-customer compliance procedures.150 The parties behind the VanEck 
SolidX Bitcoin ETF contended that such principal-to-principal trading would 
better resist manipulation in comparison to digital asset exchanges, and the 
parties specified additional procedures that would minimize the possibility of 
manipulation of the price of Bitcoin.151 
The parties seeking the approval of a Bitcoin ETF might be thought of as a 
different type of innovator in Bitcoin’s ecosystem. Their innovation is not 
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creators have sought to address SEC concerns about the danger such ETFs pose to retail investors, 
including setting an estimated $200,000 share price in order to limit appeal to institutional 
investors.”). 
 146. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-85119, supra note 145, at 5. 
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technological in character, but constitutes a commercial advance that renders a 
technology more usable; to succeed, their innovation must respond to and 
effectively address iterations of regulatory rejections and hurdles. The 
competition to deliver a Bitcoin exchange-traded fund is based on the 
proposition that a broader set of institutional and retail investors are interested 
in exposure to Bitcoin, but opt not to hold Bitcoin directly or transact via digital 
asset exchanges because of investment rules, lack of technological savvy, risk, 
or other reasons. Notably, the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF would have insured 
its holdings and followed best practices regarding storage of Bitcoin; thus, as 
VanEck has argued, investors may have been interested in the VanEck SolidX 
Bitcoin ETF as a secure, insured way to gain exposure to Bitcoin, some of the 
attractions of which include its role as diversification investment that acts as a 
hedge against systemic risk152 or its underlying blockchain technology.  
Though this ETF proposal has been withdrawn as of the time of this writing, 
it illustrates a commercial trajectory which will shed light on Bitcoin 
transactions. This development would create, as did the proliferation of digital 
asset exchanges, a potential repository of relevant transaction information 
regarding markets in Bitcoin—information upon which tax authorities might 
rely. Those who invest in such a Bitcoin ETF would, of course, be subject to tax 
reporting in the same way as others who invest in ETFs. It is more noteworthy 
that the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF would have ordered the over-the-counter 
market and made it more regulable; the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF would have 
made it easier for government to know the identities of those in some significant 
part of the over-the-counter market who have transacted directly on the Bitcoin 
network and what they are doing or have done.  
2. Bakkt 
A project that aims to serve institutions with an infrastructure for digital 
assets offers another example of the emergence of intermediaries that may 
facilitate tax compliance. In August of 2018, Inter-Continental Exchange, a large 
operator of global exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange, 
announced plans to form a company—Bakkt—that would offer a regulated 
platform for institutions and consumers to buy, sell, store, and spend digital 
assets on a global network.153  
Bakkt plans to offer all aspects of a futures market, including physical 
delivery and warehousing of Bitcoin, market surveillance, reporting, and 
 
 152. Letter from Jan F. van Eck, President and CEO, Van Eck Associates Corporation, to Dalia 
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consistent standards for compliance with anti-money laundering and know-
your-customer rules.154 Bakkt also purports to offer new and higher security 
standards. Bakkt had been in development for fourteen months before public 
announcement of it in August of 2018.155 The announcement indicated Bakkt 
would partner with Starbucks, Microsoft, BCG, and others on its payment 
platform; though Starbucks will not accept Bitcoin, the Bakkt platform will 
enable customers to convert digital assets to USD for use at Starbucks.156  
Bakkt attempts to address the requirements of regulated institutions in using 
digital assets.157 Despite or perhaps because of Bitcoin’s decentralization, Bakkt 
purports to bring a secure central infrastructure to Bitcoin with the sort of 
regulatory compliance necessary for the trust of large institutions.158 In its 
spokesperson’s words, Bakkt seeks to meet the connectivity and participation 
requirements of large financial institutions.159 Bakkt aims to remedy what it 
considers the flawed state of the Bitcoin market and facilitate trusted price 
formation—a fundamental part of advancing digital currency markets in its 
view.160  
For Bakkt to function on the institutional scale that its founders envision, it 
must transact at a much faster pace than the seven transactions per second 
permitted by the base layer of the Bitcoin network.161 If Bakkt becomes the 
clearing house that it imagines, however, it can keep track of millions of 
transactions every day within the Bakkt ecosystem.162 It can keep a ledger of 
offsetting Bitcoin debits and credits, and only needs to broadcast to the wider 
Bitcoin network payments coming into or exiting Bakkt’s warehouse.163  
Whether or not Bakkt meets with success, it is another example of the 
different kinds of intermediaries emerging in this space which can facilitate tax 
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compliance. It, like Coinbase or a Bitcoin ETF, may become a repository of 
relevant transaction information that the IRS could pursue with a John Doe 
summons or through Bakkt’s willingness to cooperate with regulatory 
authorities. Importantly, part of the way Bakkt contributes to the broader Bitcoin 
ecosystem involves, perhaps obviously, more than commercial, legal, or 
regulatory efforts. To the extent it operates a second-layer ledger, it can enable 
much greater transaction speeds than permitted by the base layer of the Bitcoin 
network; in this way, Bakkt makes a technical contribution that very 
approximately resembles the concept behind the lightning network.  
3. The Lightning Network 
The lightning network highlights the ways in which resort to networks or 
intermediaries that operate with Bitcoin’s protocol is, in some sense, a technical 
necessity as more users attempt to transact in Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s base layer does 
not permit a high number of transactions per second as a technical matter.164 For 
that reason, Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja proposed the lightning network in 
2016.165  
The lightning network constitutes a second layer payment protocol that 
operates on top of the Bitcoin network.166 It would enable higher transaction 
throughput, and consists of a network of peer-to-peer, bidirectional payment 
channels in which transfers are made off of the underlying blockchain in 
Bitcoin.167 Poon and Dryja describe the network as follows: 
Micropayment channels create a relationship between two parties to perpetually 
update balances, deferring what is broadcast to the blockchain in a single 
transaction netting out the total balance between those two parties. This permits 
the financial relationships between two parties to be trustlessly deferred to a later 
date, without risk of counterparty default. Micropayment channels use real 
bitcoin transactions, only electing to defer the broadcast to the blockchain in 
such a way that both parties can guarantee their current balance on the 
blockchain; this is not a trusted overlay network—payments in micropayment 
channels are real bitcoin communicated and exchanged off-chain.168 
Multiple parties are currently pursuing this idea, and this development would 
enable a significantly higher number of transactions per second than the base 
layer of the Bitcoin network currently allows.169  
 
 164. See GERARD, supra note 59, at 69; Croman et al., supra note 59, at 108. 
 165. Joseph Poon & Thaddeus Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain 
Instant Payments, LIGHTNING NETWORK 1 (Jan. 14, 2016), https://lightning.network/lightning-net 
work-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4GK-DNSK] 
 166. Id. at 4. 
 167. Id. at 7. 
 168. Id. at 4. 
 169. See, e.g., Shirza Jagati, Bitcoin Lightning Newtwork Beta is Now Live, CRYPTOSLATE 
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D. Effect of Intermediaries on Tax Compliance 
It is understandable that early scholars might speculate upon the possibilities 
of tax evasion when examining the pseudonymous, decentralized Bitcoin 
network. That technical architecture certainly matters, and Lessig reminds us 
that four modalities of regulation, among other potential modalities, operate 
together: law, norms, markets, and architecture.170 By architecture, Lessig 
means structures of social life, whether made or found, which enable or constrain 
behavior.171 In the present context, architecture refers to the structures, whether 
virtual or physical, which shape and guide how an individual interacts with 
Bitcoin. When it came about, Bitcoin served as a novel architecture which 
enabled a kind of behavior not previously possible; users could pseudonymously 
transmit value on a peer-to-peer basis. Thus, tax scholars were correct to suspect 
that Bitcoin might enable tax evasion.172 
The cases above, however, demonstrate that different kinds of 
intermediaries and gatekeepers can fill the role of facilitating tax compliance and 
thereby make this space more regulable by tax authorities. The commercial 
demands of markets have resulted in the generation of online wallets, digital 
asset exchanges, and other intermediaries between the Bitcoin protocol and end 
users; a Bitcoin ETF, a digital asset clearinghouse, and the lightning network are 
emerging to meet other market demands. Many users, it seems, cede the 
pseudonymity of operating at the base layer for the convenience of an online 
wallet or exchange. They might do the same for the transactional speed of the 
lightning network or for the insurance and risk mitigation which other 
commercial efforts offer. The John Doe summons on Coinbase shows how the 
law may effectively operate through these structures to compel tax compliance.  
Furthermore, enforcement and norms influence one another in tax 
compliance.173 Though some have argued that enforcement might “crowd out” 
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to comply with the tax code,174 or be otherwise 
counterproductive, Leandra Lederman argues that enforcement and a 
compliance norm need not be inconsistent.175 Specifically, she argues that 
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enforcement can buttress norms-based appeals for compliance.176 She outlines 
the ways in which there may be a group norm of noncompliance despite a 
general societal norm of tax compliance in the US.177 The IRS, she contends, 
could use enforcement to build a critical mass of compliant taxpayers and 
thereby influence the taxpaying norms of non-compliant groups.178 
In addition, the development of these intermediaries is significant not only 
because they allow points of enforcement, but because they could enable 
comprehensive information reporting, or even withholding someday. The 
government could use the information for information-return matching, “a 
highly effective form of audit not captured in audit statistics,”179 or more 
traditional enforcement actions.180 More importantly, information reporting and 
withholding facilitate voluntary tax compliance, as they constrain the 
opportunity to evade tax.181 Information reporting alerts the taxpayer that the 
government is watching.182 Thus, it is extremely significant that Coinbase is 
working with the IRS to develop a form of information reporting for 
cryptocurrency transactions.183 In this vein, certain foreign tax authorities are 
simply requesting transaction information from exchanges.184 
The development of intermediaries in Bitcoin’s ecosystem holds the 
potential to enable IRS enforcement actions and perhaps, eventually, 
comprehensive information reporting and withholding. The latter two affect 
voluntary tax compliance, and enforcement actions can affect norms of 
compliance. These trajectories of increasing compliance can supplement efforts 
around Bitcoin’s distinctive and principal characteristic—its blockchain.  
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III.  BITCOIN’S BLOCKCHAIN AS A TOOL OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
Though a significant portion of users increasingly interact or will interact 
with Bitcoin by way of some of the commercial and/or technical efforts 
described above, users can, of course, sidestep those intermediaries and transact 
directly on the Bitcoin network. With respect to those transactions, however, 
Bitcoin is uniquely regulable for tax purposes: the publicly visible, trustworthy 
nature of Bitcoin’s blockchain allows tax authorities to observe transaction 
flows, and thus offers authorities a unique window into tax compliance. 
Bitcoin’s publicly visible blockchain is a transactional ledger which functions 
as a shared truth185 and cannot be falsified. Unlike cash transactions, which are 
routinely falsified in tax records,186 Bitcoin’s blockchain consists of the agreed-
upon history of transactions rather than a subsequent record of them which is 
amenable to falsification. 
This Part first offers background on blockchain’s role as a shared truth. The 
first section also outlines existing efforts by the IRS to examine Bitcoin’s 
blockchain for tax evasion.187 The second section offers another proposal by 
which tax authorities might use blockchain’s publicly visible, trustworthy 
transactional ledger to increase tax compliance: the IRS might offer a reward for 
technically savvy whistleblowers to scour the blockchain and determine 
identities that correspond to public Bitcoin addresses at issue.  
A. Blockchain as a Shared Truth 
Blockchain’s significance is best understood in the context of a wider 
deterioration of social trust.188 Indexes such as the Edelman Trust Barometer 
which document societal trust have, for the most part, shown a decline of trust 
for some time, with a recent acceleration in the erosion of trust.189 Blockchain 
offers a unique model of trust well-suited to social conditions in which levels of 
trust are deteriorating;190 in the context of blockchains, nothing is presumed 
trustworthy except the product of the network itself.191 Such a trustworthy 
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transactional record could serve as a useful tool for individuals distrustful of 
counterparties, traditional intermediaries, or central banks, but also could serve 
as a helpful tool for governments distrustful of at least some taxpayers. 
1. Falsification of Cash Transactions and the Tax Gap 
The tax gap—the difference between taxes actually paid and taxes owed—
remains a severe problem in the United States.192 The most recent estimates by 
the IRS—from 2008 to 2010, which might be yet another indication of how 
backlogged the agency is—show an average tax gap of $458 billion annually.193  
The use of physical currency plays a large part in enabling tax evasion or 
underreporting.194 Three scholars who conducted qualitative interviews with 
cash business owners outline the ways in which they underreport receipts and 
evade taxes.195 Academics have even advocated for the elimination of or 
limitation on the use of cash to reduce tax evasion.196 
In this vein, Alm and Soled describe how electronic payment systems will 
reduce the ability of taxpayers to hide income: 
The use of electronic means of payment will almost certainly reduce the extent 
of the underground economy because individuals who once routinely hid their 
transactions via cash will now be stripped of this luxury. Every electronic 
payment leaves an indelible mark; these “marks” enable IRS auditors to 
accurately access income flows. To minimize their taxable income (e.g., the 
underreporting gap), taxpayers may continue to overstate their deductions and 
expenses (for which auditors can demand substantiation), but their income can 
no longer be readily hidden or camouflaged.197  
Alm and Soled, however, identify the rise of Bitcoin and other forms of virtual 
currency as examples of how advances in technology may increase the 
possibility of tax evasion.198 
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2. Bitcoin’s Blockchain as a Tool  
In contrast to the way in which cash transactions enable underreporting, 
Bitcoin’s publicly visible blockchain offers a powerful tool of trustworthy 
record keeping. First, anyone, including the government, may examine the 
transaction history of Bitcoin. Though some perceive Bitcoin as an anonymous 
payment network, the blockchain permanently and publicly stores all 
transactions.199 This amounts to an extraordinary level of transparency.200  
Second, that ledger cannot be falsified. Cash transactions may have a 
subsequent record susceptible to falsification, if a record exists at all. Electronic 
transactions that rely on credit or debit cards fare better, though even in those 
cases falsification is possible if one is relying on a business’s records. The 
OECD documented the possibility of electronic suppression of credit and debit 
sales in a 2013 report.201 
Bitcoin’s blockchain, on the other hand, does not merely consist of a record 
of transactions; the blockchain consists of actual transactions.202 At the 
beginning of his book How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin draws a 
distinction between descriptive and performative language.203 Performative 
language effects actions in the world, the paradigmatic example of which is the 
“I do” at a wedding; it serves to seal the union. Descriptive language, on the 
other hand, contains statements that might be true or false.204 The IRS can rely 
on the blockchain because it is the performative script by which value has been 
transferred. If a recipient has, in fact, received Bitcoin, the transaction must be 
in the blockchain; he or she must rely on the blockchain as much as the IRS can 
rely on it.  
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3. Unraveling Pseudonymity 
The IRS will not be able to take advantage of the trustworthy, publicly visible 
nature of Bitcoin’s blockchain if it cannot crack the system’s pseudonymous public 
keys. Recent efforts suggest the IRS has begun to find success.  
Some exchanges or services might make public keys visible for transfers, 
payments, or donations. For example, Bitcoin Core, the developers who 
maintain the reference implementation of Bitcoin’s software, maintain a single, 
visible public key for donations as of the time of this writing.205 In a leaked IRS 
presentation on how the agency’s criminal investigators might find tax evasion 
in Bitcoin, James Daniels of IRS Cyber Crimes notes that even in the case where 
the target of the investigation does not use a third-party exchange, he or she may 
have a publicly available Bitcoin address, such as one posted on social media.206 
A virtually infinite number of Bitcoin addresses can be generated, however. 
For example, the Wikileaks donation page contains a refresh button next to the 
donation address, which replaces the address with a freshly generated address.207 
Similarly, if a user refreshes the page or visits it later after closing it, he or she 
will encounter a new address.208  
But even Wikileak’s donations can potentially be linked.209 If Wikileaks 
paid one Bitcoin for the creation of a new website, it has to create a single 
transaction likely having inputs at multiple addresses.210 If we imagine 
donations of 0.1 Bitcoin each, then Wikileaks must create a transaction with 
inputs at ten different address, and thus has revealed that these ten addresses are 
controlled by a single entity.211  
A set of computer scientists attempting to understand the Bitcoin economy 
used the “idiom of use” above and others to cluster Bitcoin addresses.212 They 
write, 
[U]sing a small number of transactions labeled through our own empirical 
interactions with various services, we identify major institutions and the 
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interactions between them. Even our relatively small experiment demonstrates 
that this approach can shed considerable light on the structure of the Bitcoin 
economy, how it is used, and those organizations who are party to it.213 
Actual pseudonymity achieved by users falls short of the potential pseudonymity 
available in the Bitcoin protocol, and significant effort would be required to 
achieve that potential.214  
The government has made inroads in this vein. At a panel on 
cryptocurrencies at the Milken Institute’s 2018 Global Conference, Brent 
McIntosh, General Counsel at the Department of the Treasury, smilingly noted 
that cryptocurrency presents both risks and opportunities from a compliance 
perspective;215 presumably the publicly visible blockchain constitutes the 
principal opportunity from a compliance perspective.  
More concretely, in 2017 the Service engaged the company Chainalysis to 
locate potential tax evasion or tax fraud.216 Chainalysis offers a tool to analyze 
and track Bitcoin transactions based on the blockchain.217 Its software can 
follow Bitcoin as it moves from and/or among wallets and exchanges.218 
The IRS presentation on how the agency’s criminal investigators might find 
tax evasion in Bitcoin shows how the IRS relies on Bitcoin’s blockchain. It 
advises criminal investigators to use a web tool that provides information about 
Bitcoin blocks, addresses, and transactions after determination of a Bitcoin 
address. The presentation describes how investigators can determine transaction 
value and transaction times.219 The presentation goes on to note different 
companies whose software can accurately trace the history of Bitcoin payments 
and wallets, such as Chainalysis and others.220 
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B. Adaptation of IRS Whistleblower Program 
The IRS has had a whistleblower program for many decades, and Bitcoin’s 
publicly visible blockchain presents a unique arena to crowdsource tax 
compliance efforts. The community of developers around blockchain often 
conduct “bug bounties” to encourage a large and diverse population of 
programmers to identify security vulnerabilities.221 Bitcoin’s blockchain 
presents a somewhat similar opportunity for the IRS to encourage a large 
population to help identify tax noncompliance. 
1. Background on Bug Bounties 
Bug bounty programs offer money, recognition, and other rewards to 
hackers who identify security vulnerabilities in software.222 Bug bounties are 
particularly well-suited to blockchains, and specifically certain autonomous 
contracts which run on blockchains, in light of heightened security vulnerability, 
unique economic properties, and other considerations.223 Bug bounties are 
compatible with blockchains partly because of the economic value of 
cryptocurrencies and smart contracts, which facilitates principled bounty-
setting, and the transparency of bounties in the context of smart contracts.224 
There are at least two benefits of bug bounty programs. First, a large and 
diverse population of hackers examines the software at issue for security 
vulnerabilities.225 Second, these public programs can signal an organization’s 
commitment to continual security improvement to third parties.226  
To achieve and maintain a critical mass of hackers who participate in bug 
bounties, many bug bounty platforms rely on techniques of gamification.227 
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Gamification involves, perhaps obviously, introducing elements of play and 
gaming into non-game situations;228 it “blurs the line between work and 
leisure.”229 
2. The IRS’s Whistleblower Program 
The federal government has a long history of paying informants for blowing 
the whistle on tax evasion.230 Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) spoke against then 
current formulation of the IRS Whistleblower Program in 1998 and called it the 
“Award for Rats Program” and the “Snitch Program.”231 Reid backed away from 
his proposal to eliminate the program, however, and the Senate instead required 
the Service to study the program.232 The Service studied the program, and a later 
2006 report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that 
the whistleblower program was more effective on a dollars per hour basis than 
the Service’s primary method for selecting returns for audit.233 This led 
Congress to expand the IRS Whistleblower Program in 2006.234 
Under the expanded program, the IRS must award payments to 
whistleblowers under certain conditions,235 and retains discretion to make 
awards outside of those conditions.236 If the IRS proceeds with an administrative 
or judicial action based on a whistleblower’s information, the whistleblower will 
receive at least 15% and not more than 30% of the proceeds collected.237 This 
depends upon the extent to which the whistleblower “substantially contributed” 
to the action.238 If the action applies to an individual, however, the individual’s 
gross income must exceed $200,000 and the tax proceeds in dispute must exceed 
two million dollars.239 Even if these conditions are not met, however, the IRS 
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retains the discretion to make a proportionally smaller award to a 
whistleblower.240 
A prominent recent case of whistleblowing on tax evasion involved the 
IRS’s award in 2012 of $104 million to former UBS banker Bradley 
Birkenfeld.241 Though Birkenfeld received what is thought to be the largest-ever 
whistleblower payout, he also served a forty-month sentence for one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the US.242 Birkenfeld had provided prosecutors with 
details regarding UBS’s efforts to promote tax evasion.243 
3. A Tailored Whistleblowing Program for Bitcoin 
Under this proposal, the IRS would periodically publicize lists of Bitcoin 
payment addresses for which it seeks identities. Players can then compete using 
technical tools to explore Bitcoin’s blockchain244 and/or rely on insider 
knowledge to determine the identities that correspond to these addresses; players 
might include the very companies that have developed tools to track Bitcoin 
based on its blockchain.  
a. Mechanics of a Tailored Whistleblower Program 
The law and regulations under the IRS Whistleblowing Program provide the 
Service a framework to disclose information to whistleblowers and relevant 
transaction thresholds for targeting its efforts. Though tax returns and return 
information are generally confidential, the statute contains a list of exceptions.245 
One exception exists for disclosures pursuant to contracts for equipment or 
services for purposes of tax administration.246 The Treasury Department issued 
Regulations in 2011 which made it clear that the legislative exception also 
allows the disclosure of return information to a whistleblower in connection with 
a written contract between the IRS and the whistleblower for services relating to 
the detection of tax violations.247 There are, of course, safeguards for protecting 
the information and penalties for unauthorized disclosure.248 If the IRS finds the 
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whistleblower can perform his or her services reasonably by disclosure of only 
part of the return information, then only that part will be disclosed.249  
Part of the attraction of a tailored whistleblower program in this context is 
that Bitcoin’s blockchain offers a great deal of information, which allows the 
IRS to disclose minimal return information. The IRS can merely separate Bitcoin 
transactions into two groups: potentially relevant transactions and irrelevant 
ones, which would include transactions for which tax has been paid, non-taxable 
foreign transactions, or transactions too small to merit attention. The Bitcoin 
payment addresses released by the IRS and for which the IRS seeks information 
could come with contractual terms that meet the regulatory requirements 
governing disclosures to whistleblowers.250 
Furthermore, the two-million-dollar threshold set forth by Congress,251 
which results in automatic whistleblower payouts,252 provides the Service a 
starting point for its focus. It can target addresses which engaged in transactions 
larger than a value of two million dollars on a one-off basis or over the course 
of a taxable year.  
In sum, the IRS can use issue lists of Bitcoin payment addresses for which 
it seeks identities; players compete to use their tools of choice and/or insider 
knowledge to determine the identities that correspond to these addresses. 
Furthermore, the IRS can provide metric-based rankings and constantly updated 
dashboards for whistleblowers; these techniques of gamification have been 
effective in the context of bug bounties.253 Though payouts of whistleblowing 
might be thought of as reward enough, those rewards are uncertain and come 
only if, and after, the IRS completes its collection actions. In the meantime, 
players might compete for points which correspond to transaction size. 
b. Benefits of a Tailored Whistleblower Program 
There are multiple benefits to a tailored whistleblower program, including 
its potential to draw a large, diverse pool of potential whistleblowers into the 
effort, and the IRS’s ability to signal its commitment to compliance. A 2006 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration report found that the 
whistleblower program was more effective on a dollars per hour basis than the 
Service’s primary method for selecting returns for audit, and gamification may 
further enhance effectiveness on a dollars per hour basis in comparison with the 
Service’s primary method for selecting returns for audit. 
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Also, a large pool of potential whistleblowers may not only represent an 
increasing number of eyeballs on tax evasion in Bitcoin; they might experiment 
with and generate technical tools which make this process more efficient. Just 
as a particular framework of competition and incentives has resulted in the 
technical specialization of miners in Bitcoin,254 perhaps a tailored whistleblower 
program will result in similar specialization. That could take the form of further 
research into “idioms of use” in Bitcoin, such as that of Meikeljohn et al., 
corresponding technical tools like those offered by Chainalysis and 
CipherTrace, or altogether new technologies.  
Second, the IRS can signal its commitment to policing tax compliance. Tax 
scholars have documented a “chump” effect, according to which nobody wants 
to pay taxes if others are not.255 To the extent blockchain can enhance 
transparency around tax compliance, it can thus help buck what might otherwise 
be a broader cycle of dwindling tax compliance.256  
c. Drawbacks of a Tailored Whistleblower Program 
There are, however, drawbacks to creating a tailored whistleblower 
program. First, there would, of course, be some cost to the Service in creating 
such a program. Furthermore, the IRS may not be technically sophisticated 
enough to assemble the proposed dashboard. Considering the comparative 
effectiveness of whistleblowing on a dollars per hour basis,257 and the possibility 
of contracting the project out, these are not insuperable concerns.  
A more serious objection centers around whether such techniques of 
gamification trivialize what should be a weighty act: turning someone in for tax 
evasion, which could result in serious penalties, including time in prison. Many 
people, Senator Harry Reid included,258 might opt not to participate in such a 
program for ethical or social reasons. The IRS, however, could initiate this 
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program with a supplemental voluntary disclosure program—otherwise known 
as a tax amnesty—which could allow people to come forward and pay back taxes 
without the risk of criminal prosecution.259  
Voluntary disclosure programs are particularly effective when coupled with 
increased enforcement efforts.260 For example, in 2008, the government sought 
the names of US clients who opened UBS accounts in Switzerland with a John 
Doe summons.261 Eventually the US and Switzerland agreed to treat the request 
as one made under the US-Swiss tax treaty, and the government received the 
names of 4,450 US account-holders.262 Around this time, the IRS announced the 
2009 voluntary disclosure program for offshore tax evasion.263 The government 
did not disclose the names it earlier received from UBS, and thus, 
unsurprisingly, many people, without knowing whether their names had already 
been disclosed per the agreement under the US-Swiss tax treaty, came forward 
to take advantage of the voluntary disclosure program.264 Here, similarly, the 
IRS could pursue increased enforcement actions, including novel proposals for 
ferreting out tax noncompliance in Bitcoin, with a limited tax amnesty.  
Bitcoin’s blockchain might serve as an important tool for the IRS. If 
blockchain is a unique model of trust well-suited to social conditions in which 
levels of trust are deteriorating,265 it may also have a part to play in restoring the 
trust of ordinary people in the fairness of their tax systems.266 Though it might 
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strike some as unrealistic to imagine the IRS using Bitcoin’s blockchain in this 
manner, the IRS’s savvy use of technical tools developed for Bitcoin’s 
blockchain267 suggests otherwise. The targeted proposal above lends further 
credence to the idea of a potentially rich relationship between techniques of 
governance and blockchain.268  
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that Bitcoin is increasingly regulable by tax authorities, 
contrary to preliminary characterizations by tax scholars and others. First, 
important commercial and technical intermediaries are emerging. These include 
digital asset exchanges, online wallets, companies seeking to profit from Bitcoin 
ETFs, outfits attempting to create centralized infrastructures that cater to 
regulated institutions, and operators of lightning networks. The case of the John 
Doe summons on Coinbase demonstrates that these intermediaries can, at least 
in some instances, facilitate enforcement actions by the IRS. Eventually, these 
intermediaries could engage in comprehensive information reporting for tax 
purposes and/or withhold and remit tax payments to the IRS. 
Second, the unique architecture of Bitcoin as a publicly visible transactional 
ledger that, for practical purposes, cannot be falsified makes it unusually 
regulable by tax authorities. The IRS can observe transaction flows, and it has 
accordingly used technical tools to track Bitcoin transactions. Furthermore, the 
IRS could spur companies and individuals to exert efforts in this vein with a 
tailored whistleblower program; it could periodically release lists of public 
Bitcoin addresses at issue with a dashboard that tracks whistleblowers’ 
contributions to uncovering the identities connected to these addresses. These 
contributions may eventually materialize into monetary rewards under the IRS’s 
existing whistleblower program.  
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